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  1COMPANY LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INCLUSION: 
REGULATING STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS IN THE 




A company’s stakeholders make up a web of relationships both with 
and within the company. The company depends on the continuing 
health of these relationships for its survival and prosperity. In many 
cases, a process of bargaining or mutual adjustment between the 
different stakeholders may be sufficient to ensure that the health of 
these relationships is maintained. Contracts, explicit and implicit, can 
allocate risks and rewards in such a way as to maximise returns on the 
investments made by all the parties. However, the terms upon which 
bargaining takes place do not always result in mutually-beneficial 
outcomes. Contracts are affected by uneven access to information, and 
hence to bargaining power. This in turn results in the imperfect 
allocation of risks and rewards, and hence to lost opportunities for all 
concerned.  
 
In this paper, we consider a number of potential justifications for 
regulatory intervention aimed at overcoming what we may call 
‘contractual failure’ in stakeholder relations. We identify two distinct 
functions of stakeholding which we characterise in terms of ‘contract’ 
and ‘innovation’. We then show how these are linked to two distinct 
approaches to the regulation of stakeholder relations, one based on 
‘rights’ and the other on ‘cooperation’. After exploring the areas of 
takeovers and company reporting, we conclude by suggesting that the 
effectiveness of regulation will depend on the capacity of legal rules 
and procedures to promote cooperation within stakeholder relations, 
in particular by generating markets for information. 
 
  12. Defining the Company’s ‘Stakeholders’ in the Context of 
Regulation 
 
A common theme running through the different formulations of the 
stakeholder concept is their emphasis upon inclusion. The idea that 
many groups, and not simply the shareholders, have ‘something 
directly at stake’ in a company is given increasing importance in 
contemporary debate. Nevertheless, ideas of inclusiveness in the way 
companies are run and managed have been expressed in terms of 
‘stakeholding’ only in the last 35 years. Despite the relatively recent 
application of the word ‘stakeholder’, a long underlying history of 
ideas and experiments has provided the intellectual support for the 
idea of stakeholding. Three particularly important influences from this 
history are noted here. 
 
One major influence on stakeholder ideas has been the succession of 
efforts to improve relations between businesses and those whom 
businesses affect. These efforts go back at least to the beginning of 
the 19th century, and Robert Owen’s attempts to humanise the 
working environment in his mills. A series of similar attempts have 
followed, including profit-sharing at J & J Taylor, governance by 
trusts at the Zeiss works and the John Lewis Partnership, health and 
safety monitoring by Mackenzie King in Canada, and conflict 
resolution by the Whitley councils in Britain. 
 
A second major influence on the idea of stakeholding has been 
Christian thought. Even where inspiration is not explicitly taken from 
the Christian tradition, common themes can be found in Christian and 
stakeholding arguments: human imperfection; human novelty; self-
consciousness and responsibility; and action on the basis of absolute 
principles. Similarities in philosophical concerns are backed by direct 
historical links. During the second world war, groups of Christian 
thinkers in the UK worked to promote a reconsideration of relations 
between society and industry.
1 A significant participant in these 
discussions, George Goyder, subsequently wrote a number of books 
  2including The Responsible Company, in which he developed the idea 
of the ‘social audit’ and questioned the nature of shareholders’ 
ownership rights. These ideas have continued in groups which have 
shaped the stakeholding debate today, such as the Centre for 
Tomorrow’s Company. 
 
A third major influence has been the development of modern 
management methods. These, particularly the methods for managing 
self-organising groups, have provided applicable content for 
stakeholder theory. The methods of self-organising groups were 
formalised by the Tavistock Institute in the UK, and by the National 
Training Laboratories in the US, shortly after the second world war. 
The methods were publicised in the joint journal Human Relations, 
and strongly influenced the development of human resource 
management. Self-organising groups offered methods for generating 
the ‘tremendous energy and directive ability’ (Bridger, 1990: 78) 
which had been observed in the ‘link between participation and the 
release of creative forces’ (ibid., 86). Chris Argyris, Warren Bennis 
and Russell Ackoff, key figures from organisation psychology, 
management theory and operations research respectively were all 
directly connected with this work on self-organising groups. 
 
These components have all influenced the meanings given to 
stakeholding. Although apparently diverse, the different strands are 
connected by particular individuals and by common themes of 
interest. Working backwards in time, the connections between the 
various groups are clear. There has been a continuing cross-
fertilisation of ideas among all those concerned with understanding 
the organisation. This interchange has offered the intellectual 




Why does ‘inclusion’ in a corporate context call for regulation of 
relations between different groups of stakeholders? The stakeholder 
approach,  whatever its moral justification, has always required an 
  3economic justification consisting of net benefits to the group, or 
society, that adopted it. From this point of view, we will suggest that a 
space for regulation exists because co-operation between the different 
stakeholders, which is the foundation of the company’s success, 
cannot be completely contracted for. Law and regulation are needed to 
shape the bargaining process in ways which foster the well-being both 
of the company and, in the final analysis, of society too. 
 
There are two broad economic justifications for basing regulation on 
the stakeholder concept. The first is an argument at the level of 
contract. Take the example of the employment relationship. In some 
long-term economic relations, high transaction costs (including the 
costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing express contracts) may 
impede the formation of contracts which would provide for an 
efficient sharing of risks and information between the parties. Where 
this is the case, the contractual interests of certain parties are under-
protected (Shleifer and Summers, 1998; Winter, 1993). Here, the 
provision of legal rights for stakeholder groups could be seen as 
completing or perfecting the terms of the ‘incomplete contracts’ 
which the parties arrive at through autonomous bargaining. By these 
means, the contractarian model of stakeholder relations can give rise 
to a rights-based conception of the role of legal regulation. The 
definition of stakeholders is narrowed to ‘those whose rights are 
affected by the firm’ and the definition focuses upon what is ‘due to’ 
stakeholders because the firm imposes upon them costs or risks which 
cannot effectively be contracted for. 
 
The second economic justification for basing regulation on 
stakeholder ideas is an argument orientated towards innovation. A 
growing body of research attests to the importance of close 
collaboration between firms, and between management and labour 
within firms, as a prerequisite for innovation (Deakin and Wilkinson, 
1996). Because innovation requires planning for the long term, but at 
the same time involves radical uncertainty over the future, the success 
of collaborative ventures depends upon the willingness of both sides 
  4to respond flexibly to changing circumstances. As a result, contractual 
relations are inevitably ‘incomplete’, so giving rise to a role for the 
law in supporting long-term cooperation (Deakin, Lane and 
Wilkinson, 1994). However, rather than seeing the role of the law in 
terms of the ‘completion’ or ‘perfection’ of incomplete contracts, its 
purpose now is to encourage incompleteness: to encourage a flow of 
information and cooperation which goes beyond the terms of any 
express or implied contract. The basis for this form of extra-
contractual cooperation has been usefully termed ‘goodwill trust’ 
(Sako, 1992). While not ruling out space for a rights-based discourse, 
the emphasis instead is on procedural rules whose aim is to foster 
learning and creativity within stakeholder relations, rather than simply 
on redistributive measures which purport to create an optimal 
incentive structure for contracting (Deakin and Hughes, 1999). 
 
If a company’s stakeholders were simply understood as the ‘affected 
parties’, or ‘those who can affect the firm,’ then a contract-based 
approach would be sufficient to govern their relations. However, the 
fact that stakeholder relations have the potential for innovation has 
very important implications. In particular, it provides a link to the 
concept of inclusion, since inclusion is a means by which cooperation 
may be enhanced. Inclusion may sometimes require regulating the 
form that contracts and markets can take. It does not mean that 
stakeholders should always or automatically have absolute rights to 
information or control. Rather, because of their importance to the 
productive process, it means that it makes sense for markets, 
information systems and contracts to be designed in ways that help all 
stakeholders to give of their best.  
 
The tension between the contract and innovation elements present in 
the concept of stakeholding has been evident in its history. 
Innovation, present in the earliest writings on stakeholding, was put 
aside for some time in the 1980s and early 1990s. Stakeholder author 
Edward Freeman visited the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in the 
early 1980s. For a variety of reasons, not least that the US economy 
  5was suffering a severe recession, discussions with researchers at the 
SRI led him to adopt their then harder line, rights-based approach to 
the idea of stakeholding. The definition of ‘stakeholders’ that he 
published referred to ‘those groups without whose support the 
organisation would cease to exist’ (Freeman, 1984: 31). 
 
The 1984 definition emphasises that production requires the consent 
of a certain number of groups, which offer an implicit ‘licence to 
operate’ (RSA, 1994). Stakeholders are those who can cause the 
institution to collapse by withdrawing their cooperation. Because 
some stakeholders, such as employees, may be more vulnerable to risk 
than shareholders, these groups might even make claim to rights of 
quasi-ownership.
3 Claims might be in terms of shareholdings, vetoes 
over ownership transfers, or rights to information about company 
activities. 
 
The definition, however, was rather more hard-line than Freeman 
needed,
 and as the debate developed, both he and other writers seemed 
uncomfortable with a rights-based version.
4 Especially in the 1990s, 
the discussion has turned back towards the innovation element, 
closing the circle with the original paper
5 published by researchers at 
the Stanford Research Institute which, in 1963, had emphasised co-
operation: seeking ideas from people throughout the company, and 
balancing planning with intuitive judgement, experience and creative 
reasoning. 
 
There is no doubt that concerns with cooperation, creativity and 
mutual benefit could be developed out of Freeman’s 1984 definition. 
But this definition tends to encourage a view of stakeholders’ rights 
operating primarily as a constraint on management. In order to 
provide some balance to this rights-based approach, we offer the 
following definition, emphasising that stakeholder participation can 
be the basis for cooperative innovation: 
 
  6A company’s stakeholders are those whose relations to the enterprise 
cannot be completely contracted for, but upon whose cooperation and 
creativity it depends for its survival and prosperity. 
 
Our definition of stakeholding has implications for company law. The 
legal system provides a framework within which the contractual and 
innovation-based models of stakeholder relations are continuously 
tested. UK company law, like that of most other common law systems 
(such as those of north America and the Commonwealth), provides 
important rights to shareholders as the ‘residual claimants’ of the 
company, but currently provides relatively few such rights to other 
stakeholder groups. The question we wish to examine here is whether 
the exclusion of stakeholders who are not shareholders from 
participation in corporate decision-making can be justified on 
economic grounds.  
 
A highly influential view of the company sees it as the focal point of a 
set of contracts or bargains, of varying degrees of explicitness, 
through which the wishes of all the stakeholders are expressed. 
According to this point of view, the interests of the different 
stakeholder groups are best represented (and reconciled) through 
bargaining. Company law plays a role in reducing transaction costs by 
supplying legal rules which operate as a kind of standard form 
contract, which the parties can modify or adjust to their own particular 
needs, but which rarely constrain or prohibit private contractual 
solutions. A principal focus for legal rules of this kind is to reduce the 
agency costs which arise from the separation of ownership (by 
shareholders) and control (by managers). Corporate governance is 
largely a matter, in this view, of addressing the difficulties which 
shareholders have in controlling managers whose interests and 
information may diverge from their own. These difficulties are limited 
wherever institutional investors are willing to intervene to demand 
changes in management policy, or where the market can use an 
outside disciplinary mechanism, such as the hostile takeover. Hence a 
  7number of mechanisms – some legal, some extra-legal – are available 
for promoting efficient bargaining solutions.  
 
Similarly, this line of thought argues that the wider stakeholders – 
employees, long-term customers and suppliers – are best protected by 
contractual mechanisms or, where bargaining is not feasible, by 
certain statutory provisions which control the exercise of contractual 
power (such as employment protection laws, in the case of employees, 
or laws governing late payment, in the case of commercial suppliers). 
What is not appropriate is to give such groups ownership or control 
rights within the framework of the company. To do this, it is said, 
would be to undermine the position of the shareholders as ‘residual 
claimants’, that is to say, as those who bear the ultimate risk of the 
company’s failure and who, conversely, stand to gain most if the 
company succeeds (Macey and Miller, 1993).  
 
Were the monitoring role of shareholders to be diluted, or shared with 
the other stakeholders, it is argued that the effect would simply be to 
entrench corporate managers against scrutiny of their behaviour. As 
we shall see in further detail below, this is the basis for the view that 
the introduction of controls over hostile takeover bids would reduce 
the effectiveness of shareholder scrutiny of managerial behaviour, 
thereby leading to a loss in overall efficiency. But even so, from this 
perspective, the issue confronting policy-makers in the area of 
corporate governance is: how should the company be regulated so as 
to enhance its effectiveness as a mechanism for enhancing the overall 
wealth or well-being of all stakeholders?  
 
3. The Regulation of Hostile Takeovers in the UK 
 
The nature of the task facing policy makers can be illustrated by 
considering the arguments for and against hostile takeovers. In other 
work, we have argued that the system currently operating in the UK 
exposes non-shareholder stakeholders in listed companies to undue risk 
in two ways (Deakin and Slinger, 1997). Firstly, it places the interests 
  8of target shareholders above those of other stakeholder groups, to a 
greater extent than is warranted by the general law on directors’ duties. 
As a result, the current law contributes to a system of incentives which 
encourages managers to favour the short-term financial interests of 
shareholders when faced with a hostile bid. Secondly, the law hampers 
the ability of potential target firms to put in place anti-takeover 
defences. This helps to perpetuate a situation in which virtually all 
publicly-quoted companies are ‘in play’, or subject to the market for 
corporate control, and hence to pressures on managers to retain the 
confidence of the market at all times.  
 
Is this situation conducive to economic efficiency? In one view, the 
benefit of hostile takeovers is not only that they can directly alter 
practices at corporate underachievers, but that they can also encourage 
better performance in those companies which, as a result of the threat, 
improve their performance, and hence never have to face a bid. As the 
‘great white shark’ of the corporate world, hostile takeovers 
encourage ‘all the fish in the ocean to swim a little quicker’.
6 
 
The contrasting argument, made at least since the mid-1980s (Shleifer 
and Summers, 1988), is that hostile takeovers can undermine relations 
of goodwill trust between a company and its stakeholders. In addition 
to damage to the internal relations of the firm, a number of negative 
externalities may also be imposed on third parties. The publicity 
attracted by one hostile takeover bid can cause employees in other 
companies to place less faith in the value of their own implicit 
contracts. Where local communities are highly dependent on a 
particular employer, the costs of restructuring, which tend to follow 
on from takeovers, may fall unevenly on such groups. This is a kind 
of ‘social pollution’ whereby institutions beneficial to many, such as 
implicit contracts, are damaged by the privately-interested actions of 
the few. Hence one company’s emphasis on maximising returns to 
shareholders at the expense of the under-protected, ‘implicit’ interests 
of other stakeholders, has effects beyond the individual takeover 
  9situation, and is corrosive to the productive potential of many other, 
similarly-situated companies. 
 
In addition, the hostile takeover mechanism, it is argued, operates 
through a relatively inefficient market. The relentless pressure of 
quarterly performance assessments for fund managers means that they 
cannot afford to take a long view of investment decisions. The 
balance of the econometric evidence is that the market assesses 
takeovers – in particular agreed bids - inefficiently, making consistent 
and sizeable errors in valuations of the bidder company, and not 
selecting the most poorly performing candidates for bids.
7 As a result, 
managers may be best advised to seek greater size, or to reduce long-
term investment, to preserve their positions (Roll, 1986). This gives 
greater credence to the argument that employees may be wary about 
making long-term investments (such as those involved in acquiring 
firm-specific skills) in their relationship with the company. For all the 




Arguments that regulations should be imposed, however, are often 
criticised by those most closely involved in the operation of the 
takeover system. In the course of our research on the takeover 
process, market professionals said to us: 
 
‘I am very strongly against the idea of requiring a positive 
proof of public interest. To whom would the proof be given? 
What standard of proof would be required? It would allow 
political intervention and it is dangerous to allow politicians to 
start to make this kind of decision.’ 
 
‘I am absolutely against any blanket ban on takeovers - think of 
the comparison with your own personal property, and the 
government forbidding you the right to buy or sell it. The 
suggestion of requiring 75% approval for control change is 
rubbish - try applying it to Parliament! In any case, 
  10shareholders can vote for this kind of change if they so wish. 
Sand-in-the-works? I would not expect increasing transactions 




Those we spoke to believed that takeovers permitted flexibility in 
reorganising economic arrangements. There was a belief that a 
bureaucratic assessment of costs and benefits would not offer the 
same thing. The chairman of a large UK plc said to us: 
 
  ‘The overall takeover process is extremely healthy. It does 
keep open the one serious option for change. I would if 
anything like to see more M&A [merger and acquisition] 
activity... and I would actually have a shorter version of the 
[takeover] process. Sixty days is too long.
10 Proof of positive 
public interest? This would be very difficult to prove, and to 
win the argument. It would block the capitalist process.’
11 
 
The argument here is not whether any regulation should be imposed. 
Regulation shapes the entire market from corporate control, from 
company law, through the Takeover Code, to the rights of employees 
under employment protection and (now) minimum wage legislation. 
The question is not whether but how and to what extent contractual 
arrangements between companies and others should be shaped by 
regulation, and to what extent they should be left open. It is on this 
issue that the difference between understanding stakeholders as 
rights-holders and understanding stakeholders as creative innovators 
becomes important. 
 
If stakeholders are ‘those whose rights are damaged,’ the aim would 
be the identification of damage, and compensation. Yet if stakeholders 
are ‘potentially creative innovators,’ the aim would be to maximise 
the gains from innovation, and to share any gains in a way that 
continued to encourage innovation. From this point of view, the 
argument as to whether the disciplinary function of takeovers 
  11outweighs the disruption and short-termism which they are said to 
cause, should not be settled solely in terms of rights to compensation. 
Regulation of stakeholder relations should strike a balance between 
accounting for past costs and benefits, and emphasising learning and 
adaptation for an uncertain future. For this reason, we should be wary 
of any particular distributive solution which is proposed for 
stakeholder relations. Instead, we should seek to create frameworks 
which can permit cooperative and innovative solutions to be found. A 
purely contractarian view of stakeholder relations – even a 
‘sophisticated’ one which takes account of implicit contracts – is not 
capable of capturing the dynamic role of innovation within 
stakeholder relations. 
 
4. Reforming Takeover Regulation 
 
A number of proposals have been made at various times for protecting 
stakeholders from company takeovers. Some of them involve 
strengthening employee rights in general, and are not specific to 
takeover activity; for example, there is a strong case for granting 
employees protection against the abuse of pension funds. This issue 
has been addressed by recent pensions legislation
12 which has gone 
part of the way to giving employee representatives a clearer 
monitoring role in respect of pension fund management. Of greater 
interest for present purposes are proposals which relate directly to the 
balance of power between managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders within corporate governance. Here, in the face of 
arguments that would give the market for corporate control free rein, 
stakeholder proponents have argued for drawing it back sharply: 
allowing more anti-takeover defences, including permitting cross-
shareholdings; judging takeovers by the public interest criterion, with a 
greater role for the Monopolies and Mergers Commission; and creating 
a tax differential to encourage long-term retention of shareholdings. In 
response, it has been suggested that those regulatory changes which 
impose a particular redistributive solution may distort existing 
markets, increasing costs without generating sufficiently large 
  12benefits by way of compensation. It is also argued that the UK is not 
an abstracted contracting environment, on to which solutions from 
other countries’ systems (for example) can simply be grafted. The 




In our view, these objections are properly understood as arguments 
against certain forms of regulation, and not against regulation as such. 
We defined stakeholders above as those affected by the firm in ways 
which cannot completely be contracted for, yet who could potentially 
interact with the firm in co-operative, creative, mutually beneficial 
ways. This approach implies a need for a framework of rules to 
provide incentives for the sharing of risk and information and to foster 
long-term co-operation based on trust, rather than one which seeks to 
impose a particular solution on the contracting parties. What would 
such an approach imply in practice for the regulation of takeovers in 
the UK?  
 
A theme running through the analysis of hostile takeovers is that both 
managers and shareholders make decisions on the basis of incomplete 
information. The best counter, then, to market and managerial myopia 
is the provision of a wider range, and a higher quality, of information 
about the company’s activities. The criticism levelled by Richard 
Roll’s ‘hubris hypothesis’ (Roll, 1986), for example, was not just that 
companies cut investment, but that they did so because of failures in 
the market for information. It has become accepted wisdom in parts of 
the City that companies in difficulty can restore share prices by 
instituting large-scale redundancies.
14 It could be argued that they 
thereby forfeit potential longer-term gains based on previous 
investments in skills and training. With better information of the 
effect of training cuts on staff morale, customer opinions, and 
retention ratios of both, the market would be able to allocate its capital 
more efficiently, and fewer myopic decisions would be made by both 
managers and by the representatives of institutional shareholders. 
 
  13The role of advisers’ incentives might also be considered here. 
Econometric studies show that expert advisers are involved in a 
business which, on average, loses money for the shareholders of the 
bidding firms, in particular in the case of agreed bids.
15 Even when 
agreed and hostile bids are analysed separately, mergers resulting 
from hostile bids lead on the whole to performance which is no better 
than the average performance in the industries in question. Viewed 
from this perspective, the failure of the market for corporate control to 
evaluate effectively the longer-term effects of mergers and takeovers 
is a clear instance of the reality of agency costs: those who own shares 
in bidder firms appear to be incapable of exercising adequate control 
over the managers who prepare and plan takeover bids.  
 
How should shareholder representatives in potential bidder companies 
respond? Their options include (1) demanding better justifications 
from the companies they invest in for any takeover bids made; (2) 
encouraging the introduction of incentive fees based in whole or in 
part on the long-term relative stock market performance of the bidding 
company. On the evidence of past practice, however, the capacity of 
shareholders to perform this monitoring role must be in doubt. For 
whatever reason, there are few signs that UK institutions are prepared 
to counter this form of managerial myopia. 
 
Under such circumstances, it is legitimate to question the widespread 
view that shareholders are, because of their role as ‘residual 
claimants’, best placed to perform the role of monitoring corporate 
managers. At the very least, we may be sceptical of the idea that the 
shareholders  alone of all the stakeholder groups should play a 
significant monitoring role. Attention then turns to giving non-
shareholder stakeholders a more prominent role, in order to balance 
the information arriving at the decision-making level. 
 
As the situation stands, the nature and content of directors’ fiduciary 
duties is a central issue. The interaction between the overlapping 
regulatory systems of the Takeover Code, the Companies Acts and the 
  14common law results in a situation in which directors of target 
companies, faced with a bid, place the interests of shareholders clearly 
ahead of those other stakeholders. Although they have an obligation 
to act with regard to the interests of the company as a whole, directors 
find themselves owing specific duties to the shareholders, for example 
concerning the accuracy of information concerning the bid.  
 
One option for reform is to clarify the law so that directors enjoy 
greater autonomy from shareholder pressure during takeover bids. 
There are models for such reform in the ‘stakeholder’ statutes passed 
by many US state jurisdictions in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see 
Deakin and Slinger, 1997). Similarly, the draft EC Directive on 
takeover bids (the ‘Thirteenth Directive’) requires the board of a 
target company to ‘act in the interests of all the company, including 
employment’ when responding to a bid.
16 Indeed, section 309 of the 
UK Companies Act 1985 requires directors to take the interests of the 
company’s employees into account when discharging their duties to 
the company. In this vein, the Takeover Code could be amended so as 
to reflect more completely this provision of the Companies Act. 
However, changing the law relating to directors’ duties is unlikely to 
have much practical effect in the absence of any moves to give other 
stakeholders, such as employees, legal standing to challenge decisions 
of boards. Nor would reformulating directors’ duties in the way 
suggested help boards to decide how to resolve conflicts which may 
arise between the interests of the different stakeholder groups. 
 
A more concrete proposal which has been made from time to time in 
the protracted debate over the draft Thirteenth Directive is to require 
both the bidder and the target companies to engage in a process of 
consultation with employee representatives during the course of the 
bid. Rule 24.1 of the Takeover Code merely requires the bidder 
company to state its intentions with regard to future relations with 
employees. Offer documents issued by bidders under the rules of the 
Code nearly always contain a statement to the effect that existing 
rights of employees will be fully respected. This says nothing more 
  15than that the bidder company will respect the company’s prior legal 
obligations to its employees; it has become a formality, which is 
represented in offer documentation by the use of a standard 
‘boilerplate’ formula.
17 It says nothing about the protection of implicit 
but legally unprotected obligations.  
 
Granting clearer protection to employee expectations (an ‘implicit 
contract’ approach) is one option open to legal reformers; in some US 
jurisdictions, rights of employees to employment protection are 
statutorily enhanced following a takeover (so-called ‘tin parachute’ 
rights).
18 Employees whose firms are subject to takeover are better 
protected than other similarly placed workers. The effect may be to 
deter certain types of ‘breach of trust’ by takeover bidders, but even 
then the best such laws can normally achieve is higher levels of 
compensation for those who lose their jobs in the aftermath of a 
change of management. In the UK, in contrast to the US, it is normal 
for employees to qualify for some form of compensation if they are 
made redundant whether or not their companies are taken over. This 
does not seem to have deterred takeover bidders to any degree. If 
anything, the presence of redundancy legislation may have helped to 
encourage a culture in which employees have come to accept loss of 
employment as a consequence of corporate restructuring, in return for 
severance payments and accelerated pension entitlements (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1999). 
 
The proposal for consultation with employee representatives in the 
course of the bid could have a much more wide-ranging effect on the 
process of managerial decision-making. The legal meaning of 
consultation, in this context, requires the parties to consult with a 
view to making an agreement.
19 Statutory rights to information and 
consultation already exist in respect of decisions for large-scale 
redundancies,
20 and where a business is sold from one employer to 
another through a ‘transfer of undertakings’;
21 however, these rights 
do not extend to changes of control by share transfer.
22 The closure of 
this anomaly (for this is what it is, viewed from the vantage point of 
  16employment law) would help to provide a basis for the monitoring of 
managerial conduct by employees. In recent drafts of the Thirteenth 
Directive, however, concerns about the possibility of lengthy and 
costly disruptions to bids led to the deletion of any references to 
employees’ consultation rights. The only requirement, as under rule 
24.1 of the Takeover Code, was that bidders should state their 
intentions with regard to the future treatment of employees.
23 These 
concerns about hampering bids appear overstated. That a requirement 
to consult with employee representatives would hamper certain bids is 
not, in itself, a good reason to oppose consultation. On the contrary, 
requiring bids to pass the threshold of consultation with employees 
could usefully deter precisely those bids whose financial raison d’être 




Consultation during bids would be most effective if it were coupled 
with a general obligation to provide wider information about the 
treatment of employees. Here, a relevant model may be found in the 
‘balanced business scorecard’ approach to company reporting. This 
recommends that companies should report on measures for customer 
satisfaction, dealer satisfaction, employee morale and empowerment, 
and environmental responsibility, alongside more traditional measures 
of financial performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993, 1996). In 
the context of a takeover bid, the impact of the bid on other 
stakeholders - on customers, employees, suppliers, and possibly the 
local community - is arguably highly relevant to an assessment of its 
merits. The decisions of these constituencies will determine the 
company’s long-term prospects. Both during takeover bids and more 
generally, it therefore seems legitimate to suggest that the reporting 
duties of both the target and the bidder company should be broadened 
to include a description of the identification and monitoring systems in 
place, auditors’ evaluation of their effectiveness, and the company’s 
performance to date in meeting the identified interests of its various 
stakeholders. Such an obligation could supplement the present duty to 
provide information to shareholders in the annual reports, and would 





In this paper, we have suggested that regulation has a role in 
enhancing cooperation in stakeholder relations, and we have 
suggested how a modest reform to the current law governing takeover 
bids could mitigate some of the more disruptive effects of hostile bids. 
We argued that the interaction of law and regulation strongly protects 
target shareholders, leaving both bidder shareholders and, particularly, 
wider stakeholders relatively exposed to risk. At the same time, the 
takeover mechanism was strongly praised by some of our 
interviewees for its encouragement to corporate efficiency. Our 
general approach to takeovers has therefore been to identify 
interactions between legal and economic regulatory systems which 
produce damaging effects, and to address failures in those systems. 
We noted the dangers opened up by payments to advisers and 
managers that did not fully align their long-term interests with those 
of shareholders; and rules on communication by managers that 
focused their attention on shareholders during bids, dissuading them 
from communicating effectively with other stakeholders, particularly 
employees. All of these have consequences in takeover situations that 
could be addressed by reforms aimed at limiting the numbers of bids, 
but equally, their effects in bid situations could be addressed by 
general reforms aimed at enhancing the flow of information about and 
to non-shareholder stakeholders.  
 
Particular solutions to the issue of stakeholder relations can be 
imposed on companies. Such imposed solutions might settle the 
contracting arrangements once and for all. But they also leave 
themselves open to problems arising from evolution within the 
economic environment. In so far as they emphasise rights at the 
expense of cooperation, they may encourage a conflictual approach to 
  18dividing gains from the firm. The particular solutions might be 
appropriate at one time, but are vulnerable to change.  
 
The reluctance to impose fixed solutions in the context of a changing 
and open-ended environment lay behind the argument for a greater 
range of information to be communicated to shareholders and 
stakeholders, and thereby into the public domain, on the question of 
stakeholder relations. The information approach allows space for the 
creation of local contracting arrangements, and emphasises the 
productive potential of cooperation between stakeholders. We have 
also argued for laws which promote consultative arrangements 
between companies and their wider stakeholders. The aim of such 
reforms would be to allow inclusive solutions to be sought. This 
seems to us to be the best way of expressing through a regulatory 
approach the essentially cooperative and creative concept of 
stakeholding. 
  19Notes 
 
1.  Notably the Christian Frontier Council, organised by J. H. 
Oldham, who edited and wrote in the Christian Newsletter. 
 
2.  See Slinger, 1998, for a more detailed account of the 
development of stakeholder theory. 
 
3.  In the case of employees, whose specific investments in skills, 
location and social relations may make them extremely 
vulnerable to the costs of corporate restructuring, these 
‘investments’ can be conceived of as being ‘like’ equity market 
investments. 
 
4.  Later writers, such as Elaine Sternberg, for example, have forced 
the issue by pinning stakeholding down to a strong rights-based 
version, and thereby provoked a reaction in those who sought to 
emphasise co-operation. See Sternberg, 1994. 
 
5.  Stewart, Allen and Cavender, 1963. See Slinger, 1998. 
 
6.  A market professional, interviewed by the authors for the ESRC 
Centre for Business Research (CBR) project on takeover 
regulation, 1995-96. 
 
7.  The extensive literature is summarised in Deakin and Slinger, 
1997; see also Mueller and Sirower, 1998. 
 
8.  See Hutton, 1995; Plender, 1997: 260. For a contrary view, see 
Commission on Public Policy and British Business, 1997: 110. 
 
9.  A City financier, interviewed by the authors for the CBR 
research project on takeover regulation, 1995-96.  
 
 
  2010.  This is a reference to the period of time laid down by the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers for the conduct of bids. See 
Deakin and Slinger, 1997. 
 
11.  Interviewed by the authors for the CBR research project on 
takeover regulation, 1995-96. 
 
12.  In particular the Pensions Act 1995. 
 
13.  See Manser, 1990, where the arguments for and against takeover 
regulation are rehearsed, the author coming down strongly in 
favour of the latter. 
 
14.  For discussion of the reasons for this, and of the pressures on 
companies to meet capital market expectations, see Froud et al., 
1999. 
 
15.  See Mueller and Sirower, 1998. 
 
16. Article 5(1)(c). See Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 378, 13.12.97. 
 




19.  See Deakin and Morris, 1998: 786-788. 
 
20.  This legislation dates back to 1975 and is currently contained in 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 
1992. It is supported by a number of EC directives (in particular 




  2121.  The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 1981, implementing EC Directive 77/187 (the 
‘Acquired Rights Directive’). 
 
22.  There is a provision for there to be annual consultation over 
merger plans between company representatives and 
representatives of employees in the Annex to the European 
Works Councils directive (Directive 94/45). However, this is 
unlikely to lead to significant employee participation in decision 
making on mergers: see Wheeler, 1997. 
 
23.  The amended proposal is published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 1997, C 378, 13.12.97. The background 
to the proposal is explained in Commission document COM (97) 
565 final. See also House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities, Takeover Bids, 13
th. Report, HL Paper 
100, Session 1995-96. 
 
24.  For reasons of space we have to pass over here some important 
issues concerning the precise scope of a duty to consult as 
proposed in the text, and the remedies which the law should 
make available for a failure to consult. 
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